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Whittaker, Treacher, and Arnott,

It was in the fall of 1781, over four years after
the Declaration of Independence, that General Cornwallis
surrendered his force at Yorktown, and American independence was realized.

Yor~~town

is generally supposed to

have been the decisive battle of the American Revolution,
but it was the naval engageme".'lt off the Vir t;i..ia Capes
six weeks earlier, when the British fleet through a
confusion over tactical signals, was driven away from the
Chesapeake Bay, that actually decided the fate of the
British forces in America.

Had Adin.iral Graves taken

advantage of his superior position when he encountered
the Comte de Grasse, who knows how long the colonies
would have struggled for liberty, or whether they would
finally have been forced into submission.

For it was

only through a combination of favorable, almost providential, circumstances, that 1.'lashington, able general
though he was, was able to gain the victory.
In the latter part of January, 1781, Cornwallis
was on the Catawba River in South Carolina, and Washington was on the Eudson, 700 miles av:ay, each with their
eyes on different objectives, and with no idea that
eight months' time would find them face to face to settle
the question of supremacy.

2

Cornwallis had been sent to the Southern States by
General Clinton to create diversions in favor of the main
armies at New York and Philadelphia--a favorite part of
the Commander-in-Chief's strategy.

He v;as expected to

bring the state of Horth Carolina under his subjection.
This involved crushing General Nathaniel Greene, who
crossed the Dan River and met Cornwallis in battle at
Guilford Court House on March 15.
battle, but Cownwallis

I

T'ne British won the

losses were so great, and his

army so weakened, that he made for the coast in order to
1

recover, arriving in Wilmington on the seventh of April.
From Wilmington, Cornwallis marched up into Virginia,
abandoning 1'Torth Carolina al together, and united at
Petersburg vii th General Leslie.
General Benedict Arnold, the American traitor, had
been sent to Virginia in December of l '7 80... He landed at
Jamestown Island on January 3 and marched immediately
to Richmond, which he plundered, then returned down the
James to take up a fortified position at Portsmouth.
oppose the British in Virginia, '1\'ashington dispatched
Lafayette with 1,200 Light Infantry troops by land and

1

Cornwallis."

Johnston, lienry P., "The Surrender of

Harper's, LXll, (A.ugust, 1881), p. 326.

To

3

persuaded Rochambeau to

se~d

some vessels from Newport

2

to blockade Arnold by sea.
Des Touches, in command of the :B'rench fleet at Newport, which had just escaped a severe gale which

wrec:~ed

three of the British squadron, et first sent only three
vessels, a sixty-four gun ship of the line and two frigates,
to the Chesapeake, but these were unable to reach the
smaller British vessels, which withdrew up the C:lizabeth
River.

Arbuthnot, the British admiral, ordered some

brigates stationed off Charleston to the spot.

One of

these, the Romulus, was captured by the French as they
left the Bay returning to Eewport.
On the evening of March 8 the French fleet under
des Touches left liewport.

A~buthnot,

havi:i.g learned thRt

the 3're)ch v:ere m:::: !<ins re2dy J")r sea,

~~Pd

moved to the

entra::-1ce of Gardiner's Bay, where r.is

sq_ua6.ro~1

lay, and

when, on t.te tenth, he learned. they had sailed, followed
im.meci.iately.

3y carrying a lart:e spreud of sail, and

because his vessels hafi cop9erea bottoms, preventing
fouling, the British a6.miral was able to intercept des
Touches about forty miles northeast of Cape Eenry on
the morning of
eight

s~ips

of

~·~arch

t~e

16.

Sach fle::t was car.nosed of

line and several SDaller vessels, but

2 Ibid. , p. 32?.

4

the

~ritish,

having larger ships, had the edvantage of

superior force.

Eowever, des Touches, by stretegicol

handling of his fleet, eluded ;.rbuthnot without serious
damA.ge and returned tc, Nevlport.

The British lost thirty

killed and seventy-ttree wounded, while the French lors
3

was seventy-two

~illed

Soon aft2r this
Phillips to

eng1ge~ent,

C~esapeate

forcements for

and one hundred twelve wounded.

~rnold.

Cli~ton

sent

Ge~ergl

Bay witt 2,000 troops as rein~fter

landing at Lynnho.ven Bay,
4

the force moved.. to rortsrwuth.
In order to cooperate witt des Touches, 1afayetLe
had gone by forced

r:~arc'.:-ies

to the t.eF:d 01' the Chesapeake

and expected there to embArk his army on the French frigates.
Ee had already set out in advance in an open boat with
sone other officers and. reac!1ed ·::illiam.sburg and. then
Suffolt before he learned of des Touches' failure.

Lafayette

5

then set out to re join ·.::ashington' s army.

'Nhen he re-

ceived news, at the head of the Elk River, of Phillips'
expedition, he turned his army about and went to Baltimore,

3 r.:ahan, e\. T.,

~.~e.jor

Otierations of the

Iiavies in the ·,':ar of American Independence, p. 1? 0-?4.
4 Ibid., p. 1?4.

5 I:arper's,· loc. cit., p. 32?.

5

where he borrowed 2,000 pounds with which to maintain his
army.

There

discontent among the troops over servins

W8.S

in the South, and several desertions occurred, but these
stopped after Lafayette had a deserter hanged as an example.

From Baltimore he marched vii th all speed through

Alexandria, Fredericksburg, and Bowlin.s Green, being reinforced by General Wayne with 1,000 troops at the North
Anna River, and arrived in Richmond a few hours before
Phillips made his

a~pearance

river.

sur~rised

Phillips,

on the opposite side of the
by this movement of the enemy,
6

retired to J amestovm Island.
Cornwallis moved to 1.'filliamsburg June 20, where he
received instructions from Clinton to send three thousand
men back to New York and with the remainder to establish
a defensive position on the coast as a buse for future
expeditions and for the protection of naval vessels.
Corm·1allis marched to Portsrr.outh and was pre per ing to
embark the troops for lJew York, when later instructions
from the Commander-in-Chief permitted him to retain
them, and further ordered him to fortify Old Point Comfort.

Finding, after a survey by engineers, that this

spot could not be fortified, Cornwallis continued on to
?

Yorktown, which he reached late in August, 1?81.

6

1.E.M.·'

p. 32?.

? Ibid., p. 32?-8.

6

Concerning this final position there has been a great
deal of controverEy.
was a poor choice.

For a defensive position Yorktown
It was completely unfortified, and

offered retreat only by a narrow neck of land, easily
blocked, especially by the large army and de Grasse's
immense fleet bottling up the mouth of the Chesapeake.
Portsmouth would have been a far better choice.

Its

proximity to Lyanhaven Bay gave immediate communication
with naval vessels, while its position on the Elizabeth
River would have permitted Cornwallis to retreat into
Carolina, out of reach of the French fleet, and perhaps
8

dragged out the war interminably.

Captain White, of

the Royal Army, w:rw saw service with Graves against
de Grasse, contends that Cornwallis was forced to take
up this "sickly, untenable" position against his own
g

expressed judgement.

Clinton later said his orders

to occupy were discretionary, and that he never received a hint from Cornwallis that the place was untenable until after his surrender.

Cornwallis maintained

that he had occupied Yorktown in v:hat he believed was
the spirit of his superior's orders, and because he
thought that in an emergency he would be relieved by
10
Clinton and the British fleet.
In any case, the

8 White, Naval Researches, p. 5?.
9 Ibid.

10 Harper's, loc. cit., :p. 328.

7

choice was an extremely unfortunate one, as later events
showed.
Lafayette, mear1while, had e;onc to 'Nillia.msburg and
from there constantly watched CornwAllis' movements.

11

Washington, encamped on the liudson River, where he
was contemplating an attack on

~fow

York, received from

Admiral the Comte de Grasse an announcement that he
would be in the Chesapeake about the fjrst of September.
This news reached Viashington on August 14.

He immecl.i-

ately concentrated his attention on a descent on Cornwallis.

His plan met tl1e approval of the French commander,

Rochambeau, and they began operations with the greatest
secrecy.

·1'iashington first made a fei:-·1t toward New York,

then turning south, repeated this ruse from r!ew Jersey, in
order to

preve~t

Clinton from learning of the intended

campaign in Virginia.

From new Jersey General ','lashington

headed directly for the Chesapea}:e.

On September 2 the

2,000 troops under his command, 4,000 hsving been left in
Eev: York, marched through Philadelphia, followed the next
day by the French army.

In that city they received news

of de Grasse's arrival in the Chesapeake with a strong
fleet.

Thus encouraged, Washington pushed on toward his

goal.

At Baltimore he embarked his troops for the James

11.Iill., p. 32'7.

8

River, and joined forces with Lafayette at Vlilliamsburg,
so that by September 2? the combined army was ready to
12

move on the British.
When Clinton finally realized the fact that Washington
had given. him the slip at New York, the only way he saw of
meeting the danger to Cornwallis was to attempt to go to
13

bis relief by sea.
garding

~he

But lack of certain information re-

strength and movements of de Grasse ' s fleet

handicapped the British in this endeavor.
Arbuthnot had sailed on July 2 for England, leaving
Admiral Graves at Hew York in cofil!'.llB.nd of the British naval
forces.

Graves wrote Rodney, then in the '.','est Indies, that

intercepted dispatches of the enemy disclosed a large
squadron from the Vlest Indies was to arrive on the American
coast during the summer, to operate in conjunction with
the French fleet at Newport.

On July ? Rodney sent the

sloop Swallow to New York with word that if he sent reinforcements, they would be headed for the Virginia
Capes and thence to New York.

He asked for cruisers to

be stationed along the coast with information.

Rodney

was misled to believe that de Grasse had only fourteen
ships. of the line.

On August 10 Rear Admiral :aood sailed

from Antigua with fourteen ships of the line, bound for

121E.!£.., pp. 329-332.
13 Ibid., p. 330.

9

the

Chesapea~e

Capes.

He had previously dispatched the

brig Active to New York with notification of his departure.
Meantime, the Swallow had arrived in New York on July 2?,
only to find. Graves had left for Boston Bay.

She was sent

on, but meeting enemy vessels, was forced ashore on Long
Island and lost.
New York.

The Active was captured before she reached

Thus, Graves was uninformed of the pending crisis,

and continued cruising until the sixteenth of August, when
he returned to Sandy Hook.

Here he found a duplicate of

the Swallow letter, but it told him only the course a reinforcement would take; not that Hood had already departed.
Eood, arriving 01'f the Chesapeake on August 25, sent a
copy of the Active's message, but these hardly preceded his
own arrival on August 28.

The same evening intelligence

was received in New York to the effect that de Barras had
left Newport with his whole division, bound for the Capes.
tood, therefore, a~chored outside S~ndy Hook, where Graves,
who was the senior Admiral, soon joined him.

On the thirty-

first the entire fleet of nineteen ships or the line, as
well as several smaller vessels, set sail for the Chesapeake, where it was understood that the French fleet and
the combined armies of Washington and Rochambeau were
\bound.

14

14 !1!ahon, pp. 176-8.

10

The British,

by

reqso::-1 of their i;iacc ura te inf or ma tion,

expected that de Grasse's fleet would ?robably be inferior,
15
Gnd certainly not superior, to their own.
'rllus, if Graves
could a ttacl<: de Grasse before he united with the Rhode Island squadron of eight s.dps 01' the line anu. severr:l frigates,
it was natural to suppose that he could

upset

effectuall~,-

the French and American plan of a combined a ttacl'. by land and
16
sea on the British forces at Yorktown.
De Grasse had left Cap Francois on August 5 with 3,300

French troops and twenty-eight ships of the line.

He an-

chored in Lynnhaven Bay on the thirtieth of the month and
instantly landed the troops, which joined Lafayette,
raising his force, then the only one opposing Cornwallis,
to 8,000 men.

At the same ti

south vii th 6, 000 regulars.

~e

'! 1ashington was

on his way

The French cruisers took a

-position in the James River to prevent Cor11wallis from
crossing it and escapi _g into Carolina.
sent to close the mouth of the York.

Other vessels were

3y these detachments
17

the main fleet was reduced to twenty-four sail of the line.
On the fifth of September, de Grasse was anchored in

Lynnhaven Bay, watering his ships before proceeding up the

15 White , p • 35 •
16 Ibid.
17 Mahon, pp. 178-9.

11

channel formed by the Horseshoe sands and the shoals of
the Middle-ground, at the upper entrance of which he planned
to anchor his fleet, in order to prevent the British from
interfering with the operation of the American and French
armies.

This be intended to do as soon as he was joined by

the squadron from Rhode Island under de Barras, consisting
of eight ships of the line and four frigates, expected at
18
any moment.
At eight o'clock on the morning of the fifth, a 1!,rench
look-out frigate cruising off Cape
making for the Middle-ground.

H~nry

sighted a fleet

The vessels were at first

thought to be de Barras' squadron.

The size of the fle3t,

however, soon convinced the French that it was British.
The boats were recalled, and preparation made to weigh
anchor as soon as the tide bagan to ebb, without which
19
they could not work out of the bay.
The fleet under Graves was approaching the mouth
of the Be.Y under a favorable wind when at 9: 30 the
Sodebay, advance ship of the British, signalled that
she had sighted a fleet, which from the oblique angle
from which it was seen, appeared as if it were stretched

18

~.vhi te

, p. 40

19 Mahon, p. 1?9.
White, p. 40.

12

across the entrance to the Bay.

Actually the French were

anchored as close to Lynnhaven Bay as their draft permitted.
The tide began to ebb at noon, and the French vessels began
to tack around Cape Henry.

Some of the advance ships were

able to clear the Cape without making more than one tack,
but the innermost had to make several.

Graves had mean-

while formed his fleet on an east and west line heading
for the entrance.

As the French cleared, they formed a

line as quickly as they could.

The van, however, clearing

the Cape first, was some distance ahead of the rest of the
fleet.
~trike

Here Graves lost his first golden opportunity to
a decisive blow.

With the advantage of his wind-

ward position, he could have swept down and destroyed these
vessels before they were in position, and while they wer3
unsupported by the remainder of the fleet, and thus made
the two fleets numerically equal, while still holding the
superior position.

20

So fixed in his mind,

ho~ever,

was

the traditional line-of-battle formation of the British
Navy that he failed to give the signal to engage the
enemy until the two fleets were drawn up in parallel
21

lines facing each other.
By 2: 00 p:•. .m. the French rear squadron had gotten
clear of the Horseshoe and was fairly well formed on the

20 Vlhi te, pp. 40-1.

21 Mahon,

p.

1?9.
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south side of the Middle-ground, and the whole line was
22

making out of the Bay.

The French were at this time

approximately three miles from the British line, with
23

their van abreast of the British center.

The two fleets

were on opposite tacks; the British, on the starboard
tack, were headed for the Middle-ground, while the French
were standing out to sea.

,\t 2:13 'P• m. Graves gave the

signal for his fleet to wear together, bringing both
fleets on the same tack.

Hood's division was now the

rear, and Rear Admiral Drake's the van.
around, the fleet stopped by

bri~ging

J.fter wearing

to the wind in

order to permit the enemy center to come obreast of the
British center.

The two lines were by this time nearly

parallel, but the smaller British fleet did not extend
with the French rear, which was not yet clear of the
Cape.

At 2:30 Graves signalled for the van to fill and

bear away ty.ro points; that is, to beer away from the
Wind and head more toward the enemy, instead of sailing
parallel to their line.

Each vessel then followed the

van ship, so that the British line formed an angle with
that of the French.

The signal to bear away was later
24

repeated twice, so that the angle became more marked.

22 '/.'hi te, 'P. 42.
23 l.Iahon, pp. 179-80.
24

·.·:hi te, p. 42.
!.Iahon, p. 180.
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This was another serious blu:ider on Graves' part, for v.i th
the British on an angle to tte enemy line, seve·;. ships of
the rear division were never able to get close enough to
go into action; a fatal mistake for an inferior force at25

tempting to attack.
At 3:46 the signal was hoisted for the ships to close
to one cable's length (720 feet) apart, and for Hood's
division to make more sail.

This was almost immediately

followed by the signal for close action, to bear down
and engage the enemy, but the signal for the line was still
flying.

The two signals were thus contradictory.

About

four o'clock the headmost ships of Drake's division began
to engage the enemy's van,

~hich

was separated from the

26

center and rear.

Here was another opportunity for Graves

to cut off the French van and destroy it.

Had the center

gone to the support of the van, the French van could have
27

been cut to pieces, but again Graves failed as a leader.
De Grasse, in order to protect his van, as well as to
decoy the British away from the entrance to the Bay, so
that de Barras could enter, signalled for his van to bear
away and take up a new position more to leewaru, where
they were at long shot range from the enemy.

Graves again

25 Mahon, .P· 80.
26 White, p. 42.

Mahon, p. 80.
2 7 James , William
avy in Adversity, p. 299.

:.a1 burn, T'ne British

15

made the signal for his von to haul more to starboard;
i.e., toward the enemy.

As they ran down to renew the

battle, the French were able to coolly direct their fire
28

at them.

The signal for the line was hauled down briefly

after four o'clock, but was soon hoisted again, because
29

the ships were too close together.

The London, Graves'

flagship, luffed up in order to bring her broadside to
bear, but this brought the ship next ahead of her on her
weather beam, which meant that the other ship would have
30
to fire over the London to get at the enemy.
At 5:30 the signal for the line was again hauled
down on the London, the close action flag still being

up.

At this time Hood finally bore down with his divi-

sion, but the French also bore away, and he was unable
to engage them.

VJhen he bore up to engage the enemy close,

the signal for the line was again rehoisted, and he had
to retake his position in the line, though the signal for
close action was still flying.

31

Shortly after sunset the firing ceased.
losses were 90 killed and 246 wounded.
are given only in round numbers:

28

~hite,

29 Mahon, pp. 180-81.

31 'i'.'hi te , pp.. 44-5.

The French losses

about two hundred killed

p. 43.

30 Ibid., p. 181.

The British

16
32

and wounded.
The two fleets continued all the next day in sieht
of each other, repairing damages.

The British vessels

had suffered gr'2atly a loft, al thoueh their batteries were
intact.

The Terrible later had to be burned to prevent
33

capture.

Graves at first tliought to renew the action,

but with his fleet so crippled, he did not do so.

Late

on the ninth of September the French fleet disappeared
34

under a great cloud of sail, bound for the Chesapeake.
De Barras reached the Bay on the tenth, and was joined
there by de Grasse on the eleventh, making a combined
fleet of 36 ships of the line on the side of the Ameri35

cans opposing Cornwallis.
On t:r..e tenth Graves
pea~e,

fleet stood toward the Chesa-

with a frigate going ahead to reconnoitre.

Early

on the thirteenth the look-out reported the French moored
above the Horseshoe i: . . the bay.

'.';hen esked by Graves for

an opinion of what to do, Hood replied that he knew "not

what to do in the truly lamentable state to which we have
brought ourselves."

Graves tl-.e n returned to New York,
36
arriving at Sandy Eook on SepteDber 19.

32

~ahon,

p. 181.

33 Ibid. , pp. 183-4.
34 Ibid., p. 183.
35 Ibid. , p •. 184.
36 Ibid.
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with colors cased, filed between the ranks of American
and French soldiers, their band, ordered not to play an
American or French tune, playing "The 'Norld Turned Up40

side Down."

40 Haroer's, p. 334.

l?

Cornwallis was now encircled by the largest fleet
that had ever filled the Chesapeake and the largest and
finest army Washi!lgton had ever commanded.

The British

earthworks were unable to resist the artillery fire, and
their own guns were insufficient to return it.

On

Octo-

ber l? Cornwallis made an attempt at retreating across
the York River with whe. t was left of his able-bodied
troops.

Part of the force .bad gotten to Gloucester when

a sudden gale arose, preventing the boats from returning
until it was too late.

The enemy had realized his in-

tention, and taking advantage of the confusion, were
37

able to force surrender.

The British general's mili-

tary chest by this time contained only 1,800 pounds,
which sum the French commissioners at the parleys did
not condescend to notice, until "urged to do so by their
38

more sordid allies."

The British troops amounted to

only 4, 017 men fit for service, while 'Nashington had
39

a force of 21,000.
On the nineteenth of October, 1?81, Cornwallis
surrendered to General '.'!ashington, as the British troops,

3? White, pp. 62-3.

38 Ibid., p. 58.
39

Ibid. , p. 63.

18

with colors cased, filed between the ranks of American
a~d

French soldiers, their band, ordered not to play an

American or French tune, playing ''The 'Norld Turned Up40

side Down."

40 Haroer's, p. 334.

I'EY TO PL.\ 'IS OF TEE CIIESAPEAEE
From 1.Vhi te:

N9.val Researches, p. ?2

A.

The position of the French fleet at anchor

BB.

T:ce British fleet at 2:30 p. m., the van bearing
down in succession

F.

The French fleet, the centre and rear edging away

C.

The I.!iddle-ground

D.

The Eorseshoe sand

E:S.

The "strong position," according to writer in the
?olitical

~aeazine

for the British fleet to have

anchored in
GGG. The position taken up by :French fleet after the
action
E.

York spit; 19 miles from Yorktown

JJ.

Position of French fleet at anchor,

accordi~g

to

?.:r. Clerk and Rear _\d.I:dral Ekris, on morning of
September 5
:'orfolk in ruins
T-'ortsmouth
0.

Old Point Comfort

R.

Hampton Roads

IJ. B.

Tl1e ver ia ti on of the compass was 1° westerl

and. the ebb tide bega:. to

flla~e

at noon.

The Plate woul

not admit of t:_e four head.most :?rench ships being inclt:
in it, but tteir positions I:lBY be easily imagined.
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